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Abstract 
The economic cost of political violence is well documented, studying its effect on a myriad of 
economic indicators such as manufacturing productivity, export performance, comparative 
advantage, cost of production, etc. While these are very important issues capturing largely long 
run effect of the political violence, short run welfare loss of the citizen due to political instability 
is mostly absent from the literature. One salient channel through which political instability impacts 
welfare is the price of essential food items. Our study uses political strikes of Bangladesh to 
examine its impact on rice price. We particularly use three types of rice – fine, medium and coarse 
to capture how the impact varies with the quality of rice and thus different income groups of 
buyers. We use daily retail and weekly wholesale price data of each district from Department of 
Agricultural Marketing (DAM) for the period 2010-2016 and pair them up with the incidence of 
strike data compiled by Ahsan and Iqbal (2016). The richness of this high frequency data allows 
us to control for all types of time and district invariant confounders using fixed effects. The results 
show that on the day of strike, rice price increases and this increase is higher for coarse rice. It 
indicates that the political strikes is costly for the ordinary citizen and the cost is 
disproportionately large on the poor more, who are the consumers of lower quality rice.  
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 1. Introduction 
The extent of political unrest the world has seen over the last one decade or so is quite 
unprecedented. A large number of countries are involved in direct civil and military conflicts, and 
a larger number are exposed to political uncertainty (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015).   These 
conflicts and the associated uncertainty have taken a huge toll on the economies, both in short and 
long terms. While a thick volume of literature dwells on the economic cost of political violence, 
our study examines how the consumers are affected due to political event driven price shocks.  We 
study the impact of political strike of Bangladesh on rice price. Since rice constitutes a large share 
of the consumers’ spending, any shock to rice price has a huge implication for the wellbeing of the 
poor people. We also examine the distributional consequences – whether the impact varies with 
the quality of rice.  
We have compiled a unique price data from Department of Agricultural Marketing (DAM), 
Ministry of Agriculture. To the best of our knowledge, this data has not been used by the 
researchers before. DAM collects daily retail price data and weekly wholesale price data from one 
sub-district (Sadar upazilla) of all districts and informs other government agencies. This high 
frequency nature of the data allows us to pair them up with the political strike data and examine 
the impact of political strike on three types of rice – fine, medium and coarse for the period 2010-
2016. 
The literature on political disturbance and price largely study the impact of the latter on the former 
– how high inflation leads to civil unrest and chaos (Arezki and Bruckner, 2014; Bellemare, 2015). 
On the contrary, our study examines the impact of political turmoil on rice price. The recurrent 
nature of the political strikes in Bangladesh allows us to move beyond typical ‘event analysis’ and 
isolate its impact on rice price, controlling for all possible confounders. Understanding of such 
impact on food price, particularly rice is important because of two reasons. First, well-being of 
general people is affected by such political unrest/violence, particularly the poor people, and this 
study highlights one such channel which is through price. Second, it also offers insight into how 
food price reacts to such shocks and its adjustment mechanism. The reaction of food market to 
such shocks also lends some insights about the market structure at different levels such as retail 
vs. wholesale.  
Political strike which is locally known as ‘hartal’ is called largely by the opposition political 
parties to press their demand. A typical strike in Bangladesh is characterized by little vehicular 
movement, shutting down of shops and sporadic violence involving law enforcing agencies and 
the opposition political parties. Since a political strike is largely a transportation shock, it raises 
the cost of transporting goods and tends to increases both wholesale and retail price. However, the 
extent of increase depends on the market structure of wholesale and retail rice markets as well as 
their ability to hoard rice, which in turn has bearing on market competiveness. If both wholesale 
and retail markets are perfectly competitive, the high price will simply reflect transportation costs. 
However, it is also important to note that political strike itself can change the market structure. 
Due to disruption of the transportation, local retail/wholesale markets can act as localized 
monopoly and charge higher price, depending on the price elasticity of the different types of rice.  
Our baseline results show that on the day of hartal the price of rice increases by about 50-60 paisa 
per kilogram. This result is robust to severity of hartal and also inclusion of a host of dummies 
which capture both seasonality and unobserved heterogeneity. Next we address the adjustment 
process. Interestingly, price adjusts slowly and drops down to its pre-strike level in about 5 days 
after the strike. We did not find any change in price one day before strike, neither on the 
announcement date.  
Since rice price and price elasticity vary substantially with quality, we consider three types of rice 
– fine, medium and coarse. On the day of hartal, retail prices of fine and medium quality rice 
increase by 44 paisa and 49 paisa respectively whereas the price of coarse rice increases by 62 
paisa. The impact on price is found to amplify when the strikes are stretched over a few days. We 
find that if a strike is a part of multiple day strikes, the retail prices of fine, medium and coarse 
increase by 1.3, 1.4 and 1.7 taka respectively on that day.  
Since price data is collected from all districts, it allows us to examine the price differential between 
Dhaka (the capital city) and other districts such as sourcing districts. Note that we conducted a 
small survey of the wholesalers in Dhaka to understand if the sourcing districts change during 
hartal. A wholesaler in Dhaka might prefer a sourcing district which is closer to minimize 
transportation costs. We find that retail price of fine rice did not increase in Dhaka while it 
increased in other divisional districts and all districts excluding divisional districts and sourcing 
districts, contrary to our popular belief. However, in case of medium and coarse rice, the retail 
price increased in all regions. The magnitude of increase in coarse rice is very robust to regional 
differences.  
In case of wholesale price, we also observe similar patterns – size of increase in price is higher for 
coarse rice. The coarse price becomes about 26 paisa costlier when the number of strike in a week 
increases by one day. These figures for medium quality rice and fine rice are and 15 paisa and 18 
paisa respectively. It is interesting how the increase in wholesale price is transmitted to retail price, 
depending on the market structures and transportation costs. This is also more pronounced for 
coarse rice- the vertical gap between wholesale and retail price for all districts is about 11 paisa 
while it is mostly insignificant for medium and fine rice. 
In essence, political strikes push rice price up in the whole country on average. It increases more 
in other districts than Dhaka. Political strikes have larger impact on coarse price than medium and 
fine quality rice. This has huge distributional consequences as the poor are the consumer of the 
coarse rice.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The literature on the relationship between political institutions and food price mostly looked into 
how food price inflation leads to political instability. Two such recent influential studies are Arezki 
and Bruckner (2014) and Bellemare (2015). Both of the studies conclude that rising food prices 
cause social and political unrest. The former study finds in a cross-country panel covering the 
period of 1970-2007 that higher international food prices significantly damages the quality of 
political institutions, increase the likelihood of frequent political demonstrations and food riots in 
low income countries. Bellemare (2015) exploited the link between natural disaster and food prices 
to identify the causal effect of high food prices on political instability while addressing that 
political instability is endogenous to food price. Arguing that global food markets are integrated 
and natural disaster in one place has spillover effects on other countries through higher food prices, 
the study showed that increased international food prices lead to increase the number of news on 
food riots and food related political conflicts. However, the study failed to show any such robust 
relationship between food price volatility and political conflicts. 
The above studies show how an economic shock such as price hike can lead to political unrest. 
Our research question is the opposite one. To the best of our knowledge, thus it is the first study 
exploring how political conflict or violence causally affects food price. The two studies above 
employed either yearly or monthly data in a cross-country or global setting, while we utilize daily 
and weekly price data obtained from different markets covering all geographic variations within a 
country which is, by construction, better integrated compared to a global context. In addition, due 
to the high frequency data, the study is better able to capture the short-term impacts. 
Although not related to food, we identify three recent studies on Bangladesh that empirically 
investigated how political conflicts affect manufacturing firms’ productivity (Shonchoy and 
Tsubota, 2016; Ashraf et al., 2015) and exports (Iqbal and Ahsan, 2016). All these studies shed 
some light on how political strikes may disrupt the input supply and output delivery system, for 
example, exporting firms’ transportation costs to port during the strikes increase by 69%. A 
number of studies documented that political conflict can affect production activity through several 
micro channels including a distorted input supply for efficient functioning of the firms (Collier et 
al. 2003; Blattman and Miguel 2010, Amodio and Maio, 2017, Macchiavello and Morjaria 2015). 
In fact, political conflicts does not let the market work properly as it disrupts input supply for 
production process by limiting firms’ access to labor supply due to increased workers absence, 
access to capital due to heightened level of insecurity in the lender-borrower relationship, access 
to foreign inputs due to uncertainty regarding the sustainability.  
The impact of hartal on food price is important to learn for several reasons including that of 
distributional implication. How higher food prices affect welfare is a relatively well-studied issue 
in the literature (Deaton, 1989; Ravallion, 1990; Barret and Dorosh, 1996; Ivanic and Martin, 
2008; Vu and Glewwe, 2011; Bellemare, Barret and Just, 2013). The findings of these studies, in 
general, suggest that food price inflation is welfare reducing and the burden is mostly borne by the 
poor. When food price goes up, the net consumers lose while net-producers gain, and if the 
proportion of net consumers is higher in the economy, the overall welfare impact is supposed to 
be negative. Since in the urban areas, net-consumers are predominant, welfare is expected to fall 
in response to a food price hike. In the context of rice market in Bangladesh, as rice is a staple 
food, a price hike due to hartal would imply a negative first order welfare impact. 
 
3. DATA   
We compile rice market data from the Department of Agricultural Marketing (DAM), Ministry of 
Agriculture at the highest disaggregated level available from all districts on the following 
variables: daily retail price, weekly wholesale price of different varieties and quality of rice for the 
period 2010-2015.  Note that although DAM collects daily retail and weekly wholesale price 
information of food items from major markets in each of the districts from 1980s, the presence of 
missing observations are quite extensive before 2010. Since we need to pair daily price data with 
the daily occurrence of strike, the price data before 2010 are too infrequent to use. The data is 
publicly available mostly at the aggregate level.1  
The political strike data is taken from Ahsan and Iqbal (2016). This dataset have information on 
the date the strike actually occurred, the date of announcement, the name of the political party/non-
political organization calling the strike, stated reasons for calling strike and the number of people  
killed and injured during strike. Since this dataset covers the period of 2005-2012, we updated this 
dataset up to 2015 to fit our study-period.  The richness of these both dataset allows us to pair them 
at the daily level to study the impact of strike on rice prices. Most of the hartals occurred in 2013-
2015. Of 190 hartals in our sample, this period saw about 86% of them. The year 2013 alone had 
77 days of hartals. Note that there were only few hartal during the period 2009-2010. This was the 
period when the democratically elected government resumes power after 2-year long military 
backed caretaker government ruling. We observe strong seasonal pattern in the incidence of 
hartal. Within a year, about 61% hartals occurred in winter during November-February. Political 
activities in Bangladesh, such as rallies, demonstrations, blockades, hartals, etc. take place in 
winter when favorable weather remains for such outdoor activities unlike in monsoon. 
DAM collects price information for a wide range of food grains including three main types of rice 
in Bangladesh -Aus, Aman, and Boro. As rice in the retail and wholesale markets are sold under 
different names, matching these two markets at the variety levels is very complex. Hence we rely 
on categorization of rice by quality which is available in both retail and wholesale levels. These 
three quality types are - fine, medium, and coarse. Although rice quality may depend on many 
                                                          
1 We had to make special arrangement between BIDS and DAM to obtain the high frequency data. Currently the 
department has an ongoing project to make the data publicly available through its website. 
factors including physical appearance, transparency, degree of milling, percent of brokenness, 
texture, aroma, and nutritional quality, the most widely used objective measure to assess the quality 
of rice in Bangladesh is size and shape of kernel: rice grain with width of less than 1.7 millimeters 
is considered as fine, 1.7-2.0 millimeters is considered as medium, and wider than 2.0 millimeter 
is considered as coarse(Rahman, 2004; Minten, Murshid, and Reardon, 2013).   
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Prices 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
(a) Daily retail Price 
All Rice 72,468 35.9 4.0 
Fine Quality 68,862 42.5 4.9 
Medium Quality 72,167 34.6 4.1 
Coarse Quality 58,110 29.5 4.2 
(b) Weekly Wholesale Price 
All Rice 7,590 29.6 4.3 
Fine 7,225 37.7 6.3 
Medium 7,570 27.9 4.1 
Coarse 6,978 22.8 4.6 
(c) Weekly retail Price 
All Rice 7,567 36.1 3.8 
Fine 7,111 43 4.7 
Medium 7,513 35 3.9 
Coarse 6,393 29.7 4 
(d) Horizontal Gap: Retail Price in Dhaka-Retail Price in Other Districts 
All Rice 60,629 2.5 2.8 
Fine 57,515 3.8 3.9 
Medium 60,285 1.7 3.1 
Coarse 42,624 2.4 3.2 
(e) Vertical Gap: Retail Price-Wholesale Price 
All Rice 7,567 6.5 2.9 
Fine 7,111 5.2 4.8 
Medium 7,513 7.1 3.4 
Coarse 6,393 6.7 2.9 
 
The DAM food price database also contains information on rice price by identical quality 
categorization. We lump together all price information for all varieties within a specific quality 
category in a certain market to construct an average price measure for that specific quality-market 
combination. For illustration, on a certain date “t”, in market “m”, if “n” different varieties of fine 
quality rice is available with the retail prices of Pn, the average price of fine rice in market “m” on 
date “t” can be expressed as 𝐴𝑚,𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒 =
∑ 𝑃𝑛
𝑛
1
𝑛
. This procedure is followed for all three quality 
categories across all 64 markets at the daily level to construct the measure on retail prices and at 
weekly-level to construct the measure on wholesale prices. Combining all varieties across qualities 
would yield an average price measure for all types of rice available in a market, which can be 
expressed as 𝐴𝑚,𝑡 =
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑛
𝑛
1
3
𝑗=1
𝑛
, where j =1(fine), 2(medium), and 3(coarse). Note that the average 
price measures are constructed on a daily basis for retail prices and on a weekly basis for wholesale 
prices.   
We report descriptive statistics for various types of rice prices in Table 1. Since quality of rice may 
influence rice prices, we report all of the descriptive statistics on rice prices by quality type.  The 
daily average retail price of rice during the sample period was 35.9 Taka/Kg.  As expected, average 
price of fine rice is higher than medium and coarse quality rice by 7 Tk./Kg and 13 Tk./Kg 
respectively. Average weekly wholesale prices of fine rice are 35% higher than medium quality 
rice and 65% higher than coarse quality rice while the wholesale price of medium quality rice is 
22% higher compared to coarse quality rice. The standard deviation of fine rice is higher compared 
to the rest for both wholesale and retail prices.  
As the wholesale prices are available at the weekly level, to facilitate a comparison between the 
two, weekly retail prices are calculated as well. The average weekly wholesale prices are 6.5 
Taka/Kg lower compared to weekly average of retail prices. Interestingly, this gap is larger for 
medium and coarse quality rice compared to that of fine quality rice. The spatial difference in rice 
price is examined through the difference in daily retail price between Dhaka and other districts. 
We pick Dhaka as the reference point because it is the capital and center of major economic 
activities of the country. It appears that daily retail price of rice in Dhaka is on average 2.5 Tk./Kg 
higher compared to the price in the rest of the country. The magnitude of the difference is largest 
for fine quality rice. It is interesting to note that this difference is larger for coarse quality rice 
relative to that for medium quality rice (2.4 Tk./Kg vs. 1.7 Tk./Kg). 
As a first order check on how prices response to hartal, we plot incidence of hartal with average 
retail and wholesale prices for fine, medium and coarse quality rice by month of a year (Figure 1-
Figure3). It is clearly evident form these plots that retail and wholesale prices of rice move 
together. Although the plots are on monthly prices, the gap between retail and wholesale prices is 
lowest for fine quality rice. This is in line with the numbers reported for vertical gaps in Table 1. 
However, the co-movement between rice prices and incidence of hartals are not very clear. The 
average retail and wholesale rice prices exhibit an episode of rising trend during the period of 2011 
and 2013-2014 that also observed hartal at higher frequencies. Note that during the first quarter 
of 2015, the country went through series of political turbulences and observed a large number of 
hartals.  However, rice prices were actually exhibiting a falling trend then. This is consistent across 
all types of rice qualities. Combining these evidences, no clear pattern is obtained on the 
relationship between rice prices during hartal. 
Figure 1: Average Monthly Price of Fine Quality Rice 
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Figure 2: Average Monthly Price of Coarse Quality Rice 
 
Figure 3: Average Monthly Price of Medium Quality Rice 
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An unconditional mean comparison between rice prices during hartal and non-hartal days would 
provide some preliminary idea on whether hartal and rice prices are correlated. As Figure 4 shows, 
daily retail prices of rice on hartal days are, in general, higher than that on non-hartal days, a 
pattern that exhibits statistical significance across all quality types. This price difference appears 
to be largest for fine quality rice (1.93 Tk./Kg) compared to medium(1.6 Tk./Kg) and coarse 
quality(1.62 Tk./Kg). However, this pattern of higher price on hartal days cannot be attributed to 
hartal, as many confounding factors might exist that can influence both of the variables. The 
following sections will elaborate on this. 
Figure 4: Mean Comparison of Retail Rice Price between Hartal and non-Hartal Days 
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A wholesaler in any market would pick a sourcing district which is nearer to minimize transaction 
costs. Encountering a cost shock, such as rise in transportation costs due to hartal, a wholesaler 
may switch to a new source to minimize costs under the changing scenario. Alternatively, if such 
cost shocks are recurring, the wholesaler may incorporate such uncertainties into a dynamic cost 
minimization problem, in which case the sourcing markets may remain constant. This has 
important implication for our research question. If wholesalers alter their trading pattern in 
response to hartal, it would be difficult to disentangle the impact of hartal vs. that of changing 
sources-what is exactly causing the movement in rice price, if any.  
In this context, we conducted a small survey of the wholesalers in Dhaka to understand if the 
sourcing districts change during hartal. The survey interviewed 18 wholesalers (aratdars as well, 
as they have private storage arrangement) in detail, who are drawn from 5 large well-known 
markets in Dhaka Sadar including Badamtali and Wiseghat bazar, Shambazar, Karwan Bazar, 
Mohammadpur Krishi Market, and Babu Bazar. Note that all wholesalers we surveyed buy, store 
and sell different varieties of rice. Their average year of experience in rice business is about 21 
years. Approximately, 89% of these wholesalers mentioned procuring rice from rice millers or 
wholesalers in other districts. Their average rice storage capacity is 1658 maunds, ranging between 
250 to 3000 maunds. The wholesalers mainly procure from Bogra, Chapai Nawabganj, Dinajpur, 
Naogaon, Kushtia, Mymensingh, Pabna, Sherpur, and Tangail, with an average monthly sourcing 
frequency of 6.3 times.  
The market survey revealed that although sourcing districts vary across wholesalers, it has been a 
constant source over time for each wholesaler. The wholesalers of rice in Dhaka are not likely to 
change their procurement source even during regular and politically stable time, non-hartal period. 
When asked whether their souring pattern changes during politically turbulent time, none of them 
mentioned about taking such adaptation measure during any of the hartals that took place during 
last 7 years (Figure A1 in the appendix). Note that this pattern of sourcing is justifiable as searching 
involves transaction costs and forming long-term trading relationship may minimize such costs, 
especially during uncertain political environment. However, all of the respondents mentioned that 
the main shock in the upstream of their supply chain comes through higher transportation costs 
during the hartal. When asked to compare their transportation costs of sourcing by hartal period, 
the wholesalers recalled that such costs went up, on average, by 16% during the year 2014-2015 
(14,721 taka vs. 17,120 taka for one shipment of rice by truck from sourcing districts to Dhaka). 
 
4. ESTIMATION STRATEGIES  
 
The objective of this study is to identify the impact of political strikes on the price of rice, the 
staple food of the country. Accordingly, the emphasis will not direct toward modeling the pricing 
behavior of the rice market in Bangladesh. It would assume a reduced form specification with all 
sorts of controls to rule out spatial and temporal confounders.  
4.1 Empirical Specification 
The benchmark specification is 
𝑃𝑖𝑑𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃𝑑 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜃𝑡
𝑤 + 𝜃𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜑𝑑
𝑦 + 𝜖𝑑𝑡,              (1)  
where i=retail or wholesale. In the above specification, the key variables 𝑃𝑖𝑑𝑡 is the price of rice 
at level i for district d on day t, 𝐻𝑑𝑡 is a binary variable which assumes one if district d observes a 
hartal on day t and zero otherwise, and 𝐾𝑑𝑡 denotes total number of people killed due to political 
violence during hartal observed on day t. Thus, 𝛽𝐻 captures the key parameter of interest - the 
effect of strike in this case. Since 𝐻𝑑𝑡 is an indicator variable for hartal-days, 𝐾𝑑𝑡 would capture 
the severity of hartal or how intensely a hartal was demonstrated.  
A set of fixed factors are included in specification 1 to control for spatial and temporal factors that 
can potentially contaminate 𝛽𝐻. The dummies for district fixed effects is denoted by 𝜃𝑑, which 
capture the unobserved, time-invariant characteristics of districts/markets that might be correlated 
with both rice price and strike. We also include a set of time variables in our regression model to 
capture any seasonal pattern of the rice prices including a day-of-year trend (𝜑𝑑
𝑦
), month fixed 
effects (𝜃𝑚) and year fixed effect (𝜃𝑦). For instance, rice prices may exhibit strong systematic 
patterns due to growing season.  We further control for low frequency seasonal patterns by 
including “day-of-the-week” fixed effect (𝜃𝑡
𝑤) and “week-of-the-year” fixed effect (𝜃𝑤
𝑦
) to capture 
any systematic variations of rice prices by days during a week, and by weeks in a year. Finally, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
is the error term that we assume to be orthogonal to 𝐻𝑑𝑡 once all of the above fixed factors are 
taken care of. We use robust standard errors that are clustered at the district and week level for 
retail prices. 
Note that as wholesale prices are available only at the weekly level, in the case of weekly prices, 
𝐻𝑑𝑡 is defined as the number of political strikes in a week. Accordingly, the set of seasonal controls 
for weekly return will be different from the daily one, specified as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑑𝑤 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑤 + 𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑑𝑤 + 𝜃𝑑 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜃𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜑𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜖𝑑𝑤,              (2)   
where w denotes week, 𝜑𝑤
𝑦
  is week-of-year trend, and all other variables and parameters denote 
the same as stated for specification 1. We use robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
district and week level for all weekly price analysis. 
 
Cumulative Effect on Retail price  
The adjustment process would look into the impact of hartal on rice prices within a window 
consisting the strike day. The following specification will be estimated separately by incorporating 
hartal windows (hartal and the following day, hartal and following two consecutive days, and it 
goes upto hartal and five consecutive days) into specification 1 in place of hartal indicator: 
𝑃𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻
𝑛 ∑ 𝐼𝑑𝑡
𝑛𝐻+5
𝑛=𝐻  + 𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃𝑑 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜃𝑡
𝑤 + 𝜃𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜑𝑑
𝑦 + 𝜖𝑑𝑡,                             (3) 
 
where  𝐼𝑑𝑡
𝑛  is the indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 starting from the day of Hartal  to the 
5th consecutive days after hartal(H), and 0 for all other days. Thus, 𝛽𝐻
𝑛 would be interpreted as the 
n-days cumulative impact of hartal. All other variables and parameters would assume the same 
notations as stated for specification 1. 
Effect on Horizontal Margin  
For horizontal margin, retail prices of all districts are compared with that of Dhaka-the capital of 
the country that is predominantly a hub for both economic and political activity. The horizontal 
margin is thus defined as the difference between retail price of Dhaka and other districts.  
𝐷ℎ𝑑 𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃𝑑 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜃𝑡
𝑤 + 𝜃𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜑𝑑
𝑦 + 𝜖𝑑𝑡,          (4) 
where 𝐷ℎ𝑑𝑡 is the difference in rice price between Dhaka and district d in period t All other 
variables and parameters would assume the same notations as stated for specification 1 except for 
𝜃𝑑, which is the district-pair fixed effect in the current specification, for example, distance. 
Effect on Vertical Margin  
The vertical margin is defined as the difference between retail price and wholesale price of each 
district.  
𝛿𝑣𝑑𝑤 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑤 + 𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑑𝑤 + 𝜃𝑑 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜃𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜃𝑦 + 𝜑𝑤
𝑦 + 𝜖𝑑𝑤,              (5)  
where 𝛿𝑑𝑤 is the weekly difference between retail and wholesale prices in district d in week w. All 
other variables would assume the same notations as stated for specification 2. 
4.2  Econometric Issues 
The identification strategy laid out above rule out several confounding scenarios. First, it could be 
the case that both the rice market and the decision to call a strike respond to a common factor such 
as an economic shock. Although the rice market in Bangladesh may respond to an economic shock, 
such as a sudden oil price spike, the calling of strikes due to such economic reasons is not common 
in Bangladesh. In their political strike database, Ahsan and Iqbal (2016) provides detail on the 
official reasons for calling strike, which reveals that the electoral reform has been the most 
common reasons for calling political strike( Figure A2 in the appendix). It appears that only about 
3-4% of the strikes could be attributed to economic reasons. This evidence thus rule out the 
possibility of having an economic shock type third factor that is driving both announcement of 
strike and rice price movement. 
Next, both the rice price spikes and strikes have propensity to occur during the same period, though 
possibly for different reasons. Drawing causal inference requires that our estimation strategy must 
cancel out all such effects. In order to probe this, we plot monthly average of wholesale and retail 
price of rice and number of political strikes in a month (Figure 5a and b).  
Figure 5a and 5b shows strong indication of seasonality in political strike data– about 61 
percentages of strikes occurred during the winter in the months from November to February. The 
average prices of rice, both wholesale and retail, tend to move upward during last two months of 
the year – November and December, and exhibit a steep increase up to February of the following 
year. However, higher rice prices can be coincided with occurrence of greater number of strikes in 
winter due to completely different reasons. Economic activities tend to pick up during the winter, 
as November-December coincides with “Aman-rice” harvesting while November-January 
coincides with “Boro-rice” sowing seasons. Further, this is the time-period when festivities pick 
up and aggregate demand for rice rises. Political parties utilize the mild, favorable weather in the 
winter to stimulate political activities, and are thus more likely to call hartal during this time.  
Figure 5a: Average Monthly Wholesale Price of Rice (Taka/Kg) and Number of Hartals 
 
Figure 5b:   Average Monthly Retail Price of Rice (Taka/Kg) and Number of Hartals 
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The low frequency seasonality can also affect both rice price and political strikes. For example, 
anticipation of a government policy change may generate widespread uncertainty among mass 
people for short-window of time, and perturb the rice market and political environment at the same 
time. The presence of such pattern is examined by plotting average retail price and frequency of 
hartal by week of the year, as depicted in Figure 6. During some of the weeks (week 3 to 8, week 
27 to 29, week 39, week 46 to 52), some pattern between rice price and hartal is noticeable. 
Although not reported here, a similar pattern is observed for weekly wholesale prices as well. 
Similarly, we examine the issue of day-of-week effects by plotting average rice price and 
occurrence of strike on a day of a week (Figure 7). The figure shows a subtle pattern in that the 
first three week days (Sunday-Tuesday) are more likely to exhibit more strikes as well as higher 
price while the weekend (Friday-Saturday) is more likely to observe lower prices and less political 
strike. Therefore, if we do not control for day-of-week effect, the coefficients in regressions may 
pick up spurious correlations. In this backdrop, we include a host of fixed effects that would 
capture the effect of year, month, day-of-week, “week-of-year” as well as time trend in order to 
isolate the noises due to all sorts of possible seasonality.  
Figure 6: Weekly Trend in Average Retail Prices (Taka/Kg) of Rice 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
33.0
33.5
34.0
34.5
35.0
35.5
36.0
36.5
37.0
37.5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51
N
o
 o
f 
H
ar
ta
ls
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
et
ai
l p
ri
ce
 (
Tk
./
K
g)
Week of the Year
No of Hartals  Weekly retail price
Figure 7: Number of Hartals and average of daily retail price by day of the week 
 
Third, spatial unobservables may play confounding role as some unobserved characteristics of the 
district-level markets may be correlated with political strikes, particularly with the exposure to and 
severity of strike. The exposure heterogeneity across  markets arise due to that different stages in 
the rice value chain may assume differentiated structure at different places and political parties 
may exhibit variation in popularity as well as organizational capacity across locations. That is, 
markets in different locations may be exposed to strikes at different intensities that may lead to 
identification problem for isolating the impact of hartal on rice prices. In order to capture all such 
spatial heterogeneity we include market-fixed effects that would also take care of all sorts of 
market-specific spatial factors that are invariant over time.  
However, the location specific fixed factors along with all seasonal controls would not be 
adequate, if there exists market-specific fixed factors that vary over time. For example, input costs 
for rice may rise over time differentially across districts, or that natural disasters may not affect 
rice production areas in the same manner. To assess whether such possible confounders are 
contaminating our estimates, we include district-year specific fixed effects in some of the 
specifications. Finally, in our high frequency empirical setting, the errors may exhibit across time 
correlation within markets as well as across markets within time. To address such issues, we 
exploit two-way clustering-all of the standard errors are clustered over markets and time (days for 
retail prices and weeks for wholesale prices).The precision of the estimates from our model may 
therefore be interpreted as conservative. 
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5. Estimation and Results  
A. Effect on Rice Price   
The impact of hartal on rice price is reported in Table 1. Specification I does not include any 
controls other than hartal variable. The coefficient of hartal thus suggests that rice price and 
hartals exhibit a positive and statistically significant association, which means that rice prices are 
higher during hartal compared to non-hartal period.  However, since this positive association is 
nothing but mere correlation, specification II-IV control for various trend and fixed factors which 
may be correlated both with rice price and hartal in a number of ways as described in previous 
sections. Specification III controls for stricter district-year specific unobserved fixed factors 
instead of individual district and year fixed factors while specification IV includes an indicator for 
the announcement day of the hartal in place of a hartal dummy.  
Table 1: Impact of Hartal on Rice Price 
  I II III IV 
Hartal dummy 0.643*** 0.543*** 0.536***  
  [0.049] [0.164] [0.162]  
      
Announcement Dummy    -0.274 
     [0.262] 
Total  Killed 0.063*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 
  [0.001] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] 
Constant 35.567***    
  [0.016]    
N 72472 72472 72472 72472 
Adj. R-sq. 0.042 0.712 0.773 0.711 
Quadratic Trend  YES YES YES 
District Fixed Effect  YES  YES 
Year Fixed Effect  YES  YES 
District-Year Fixed Effect   YES  
Day of Week Fixed Effect  YES YES YES 
Week of Year Fixed Effect  YES YES YES 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district and daily level. 
The coefficient of hartal in specifications II and III suggest that rice prices increase during the 
hartal days in a statistically significant manner, and the impact of hartal on rice prices is 
approximately 0.54 taka/Kg. Invariability of the coefficient of hartal across specification II and 
III reveal that time-variant unobservables do not exhibit differentiated spatial variation that can 
affect prices across districts differentially. As the announcement indicator turns out to be 
statistically insignificant, it appears that the announcement of hartal does not have any impact on 
rice prices. The coefficient of “Total Killed”, which captures the severity of hartals, turns out to 
be positive and statistically significant in a consistent way. Although the coefficient is of smaller 
magnitude (in the range 0.03-0.06), its consistent statistical significance imply that inclusion of 
this variable is critical for a meaningful interpretation of the coefficient of hartals net of severity.  
B. Adjustment Process of Rice Price after Hartal 
Given the evidence that rice prices increase due to hartals, the immediate question that follows is 
how long the impact persists, or how long it takes for prices to return to pre-hartal level. This 
section expands on this analysis. Following the days after hartal, five consecutive windows are 
constructed to examine the cumulative impact of hartals. For example, “hartal and 1 day after” is 
the 2-day window that will reveal the cumulative impact of hartal on rice price on hartal day and 
1 day after hartal. The specification with full set of controls (specification II in Table 1) is 
estimated and the results are presented in Table 2. The estimates suggest that the impact of hartal 
persists up to second day of hartal. Due to hartal, the rice price increases by 0.54 Tk./Kg but it 
starts to fall from the following day. The 2-day cumulative impact of hartal on rice price is 0.26 
Tk./Kg which is statistically significant at less than 10 percent level. The cumulative impact 
shrinks in a consistent manner as the hartal-window widens. The pattern is clearly evident in 
Figure 8. Similar pattern was not observed when impacts were checked on the day before hartal. 
Figure 8: Adjustment Process of Rice Price after Hartal 
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The cumulative impact of hartal thus persists beyond the hartal-day though for a short period of 
time. The price level returns to the pre-hartal level on the second day following a hartal as the 
statistical significance of cumulative impact suggests. This is consistent if rice is storable and the 
disruption in the supply chain that hartal creates does not persist beyond the hartal day. Similar 
patterns were not observed when impacts were checked on the day before hartal. Irrespective of 
quality of rice, the retail price of rice remains largely unchanged on the eve of hartal.2 
Table 2: Impact of Hartal on Rice Price-Adjustment Process 
  I II III IV V VI 
Hartal dummy 0.543***      
  [0.164]      
Hartal and 1 day after  0.261*     
   [0.145]     
Hartal and 2 days after   0.184    
    [0.137]    
Hartal and 3 days after    0.100   
     [0.127]   
Hartal and 4 days after     0.0206  
      [0.121]  
Hartal and 5 days after      0.0369 
       [0.119] 
Total  Killed 0.0278*** 0.0320*** 0.0330*** 0.0343*** 0.0355*** 0.0353*** 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
N 72472 72472 72472 72472 72472 72472 
Adj. R-sq. 0.712 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of Week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week of Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district and daily level.  
If hartal disturbs the transportation system which induces retailers to incur higher costs to obtain 
the supply from the upstream, this will be reflected through higher retail prices of rice. Again, 
though hartal is a recurring political event, it creates uncertainty about the political and economic 
environment of the country. As such uncertainty may give rise to expectation induced shock among 
the consumers and retailers, price of rice may increase depending on the expectation and elasticity 
parameters of demand and supply. However, when the hartal ends, such uncertainty dissipates, 
agents update information set, market adjusts in a day or two, and price level returns to normal 
level consequently.  
                                                          
2 The empirical exercise is conducted because political parties may demonstrate for building support in favor of 
hartal, the disruption of the supply chain may thus sets in ahead of the hartal-day.   
C. Heterogeneity in the Impact of Hartal 
The heterogeneity of hartal’s impact on rice price is examined by incorporating the quality of rice, 
length of hartal, and spatial variation into the analysis. Panel (a) in Table 3 presents rice-quality 
specific estimates while panel(b) presents the estimates by length of hartal (single day vs. multiple 
days). On the days of hartal, rice price increases across the quality types-fine, medium, and coarse. 
However, the price of coarse rice, which is of relatively lower quality, increases by the larger 
magnitude (0.62 Tk./Kg higher compared to 0.44-0.48 Tk./Kg for fine and medium rice). Note that 
the difference in the coefficient of hartal between coarse and fine, and coarse and medium varieties 
turn out to be statistically significant. All of the estimates in panel (b) reveal that it is primarily 
multiple-day hartals that affect the rice price. When a hartal spans over multiple days, rice price, 
on average, goes up by 1.5Tk./Kg compared to non-hartal days. Being consistent with the pattern 
noted in panel (a), the largest price increase is observed for coarse rice (1.7 Tk./Kg), by 0.3-0.4 
Tk./Kg more compared to fine and medium rice.  
Table 3: Impact of Hartal on Rice Price, Quality Heterogeneity and Length of Hartal 
 
 (a) Variety of Rice 
 All Rice Fine Rice Medium Rice Coarse Rice 
 I II III IV 
Hartal dummy 0.543*** 0.444*** 0.488*** 0.622*** 
 [0.164] [0.154] [0.168] [0.181] 
Total killed 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.036*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
Adj. R-sq. 0.712 0.642 0.639 0.719 
 (b) Single day vs. Multiple day Hartals 
 I II III IV 
Single Day Hartal 0.156 0.103 0.115 0.178 
 [0.166] [0.155] [0.169] [0.184]    
Multiple Day Hartal 1.496*** 1.287*** 1.403*** 1.692*** 
 [0.256] [0.247] [0.270] [0.278]    
Total killed 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.016** 0.026*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]    
N 72472 68864 72168 58111 
Adj. R-sq. 0.236 0.643 0.641 0.722 
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES YES 
District Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Day of Week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Week of Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district and daily level. The difference in the coefficient of hartal between fine and coarse varieties 
exhibit statistical significance at less than 1 percent level while that between medium and coarse quality at less than five percent 
level. 
The estimates in Table 3 further suggests that retail prices of rice increase during hartal and such 
price hike would affect the coarse rice market mostly. Similar to the analysis in Table 2, the 
adjustment process of retail prices is examined by rice varieties as well, as presented in Figure A3 
in the appendix. The impact of hartal on fine and medium rice prices is not observed beyond the 
hartal day. In contrast, the impact persists for coarse rice for one additional day after hartal ends. 
Thus, the persistence of high price beyond the hartal day, as observed in Figure 8 as well, is mainly 
driven by coarse quality rice varieties. Once the hartal event is over, prices of all varieties return 
to pre-hartal level within 1-2 days.   
The spatial heterogeneity in the impact of hartal on rice prices worth investigation due to 
differences in terms of rice productivity, market size, and regional variation in relative strength of 
the political parties.  While examining the regional variation, the whole country is split into four 
parts: (a) Dhaka only, (b) 8 Divisional administrative districts (Headquarters),3 (c) Non-divisional 
districts, and (d) Major rice growing districts. Dhaka is the most populated district consisting of 
the capital of the country, which is the center of economic and political activities. The divisional 
districts and non-divisional districts are grouped separately as major economic and political 
activities of the respective divisions are concentrated and organized in divisional district 
headquarters. The rice growing districts are grouped together to examine if the production channel 
plays any differentiated role there. 
The estimates reported in Table 4 suggest that in response to hartal, retail prices of rice exhibit 
differential impact across regions. Hartal has no impact on rice price in Dhaka (specification I, 
panel a) and relatively smaller impact in divisional headquarter districts (0.43 Tk./Kg) compared 
to other districts and rice growing districts (0.56 Tk./Kg). The disaggregated estimates by quality 
of rice varieties reveal that the market for best quality rice in Dhaka does not respond to hartal. In 
contrast, price of medium and coarse quality rice does, but by a smaller magnitude relative to other 
divisional districts, non-divisional districts, or procurement districts (0.29-0.30 Tk./Kg vs. 0.42-
0.64 Tk./Kg). Again, similar to the findings presented in Table 2, the impact of hartal appears to 
be largest on the prices of coarse rice relative to others across all of the regions. 
 
                                                          
3 The divisional districts include Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Barisal, Mymensingh, 
Sylhet and Rangpur   
Table 4: Impact of Hartal on Rice Price, Regional Heterogeneity 
  I II III IV 
 (a) All Rice 
  Dhaka Only 
Divisional HQ 
Districts 
Excluding 
Divisional HQs Growing Districts 
Hartal Dummy 0.066 0.431** 0.561*** 0.572**  
  [0.181] [0.165] [0.166] [0.191] 
Total Number Killed 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.023** 
  [0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
N 3587 27736 171407 30340 
Adj. R-sq 0.138 0.179 0.243 0.215 
  (b) FINE 
  Dhaka Only 
Divisional HQ 
Districts 
Excluding 
Divisional HQs Growing Districts 
Hartal Dummy 0.272 0.497** 0.434*** 0.385** 
  [0.221] [0.153] [0.156] [0.139] 
Total Number Killed 0.060*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.024** 
  [0.012] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] 
N 1280 9468 59396 10408 
Adj. R-sq 0.794 0.729 0.63 0.656 
 (c) MEDIUM 
 Dhaka Only 
Divisional HQ 
Districts 
Excluding 
Divisional HQs Growing Districts 
Hartal Dummy 0.294** 0.419** 0.496*** 0.484** 
  [0.150] [0.168] [0.174] [0.178] 
Total Number Killed 0.048*** 0.029** 0.024*** 0.016** 
  [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006] 
N 1276 9561 62607 10464 
Adj. R-sq 0.744 0.602 0.642 0.684 
 (d) COARSE 
 I II III IV 
 Dhaka Only 
Divisional HQ 
Districts 
Excluding 
Divisional HQs Growing Districts 
Hartal Dummy 0.298** 0.508** 0.640*** 0.538** 
  [0.131] [0.192] [0.183] [0.168] 
Total Number Killed 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 
  [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
N 1030 8707 49404 9468 
Adj. R-sq 0.812 0.596 0.736 0.694 
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES YES 
District Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Week of Year 
Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district and daily level. 
D. Hartal and Horizontal Gap in Retail Price 
The difference in the prices of fine and medium quality rice between Dhaka and other places do 
not exhibit any statistical significance. It means that fine and medium quality rice prices are 
affected in the same manner in Dhaka and other districts of Bangladesh. However, for coarse 
varieties, the differential impact between Dhaka and other places is statistically significantly 
evident in most of the cases. Compared to Dhaka, retail price of coarse rice increases by 0.34 
Tk./Kg more in 63 other districts, 0.35 Tk./Kg more in non-divisional districts, and  0.32 Tk./Kg 
more in growing districts. In contrast, there is no horizontal gap in retail coarse rice price between 
Dhaka and other divisional-districts. The estimates suggest that coarse rice market in Dhaka 
behaves differently during hartal compared to rest of the country. 
Table 5: Retail Price Gap Between Dhaka and Other Regions (Horizontal Gap), by Quality of Rice 
FINE 
 
All Districts 
Excluding Dhaka 
Divisional 
HQ Districts 
Excluding 
Divisional HQs Growing Districts  
Hartal Dummy -0.065 -0.175 -0.047 0.054 
 [0.113] [0.091] [0.115] [0.152]    
Total Killed 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.028**  
 [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.010]    
N 57515 6970 50545 8858 
Adj. R-sq 0.47 0.512 0.464 0.356 
MEDIUM 
 
All Districts 
Excluding Dhaka 
Divisional 
HQ Districts 
Excluding 
Divisional HQs Growing Districts 
Hartal Dummy -0.113 -0.057 -0.119 -0.102 
 [0.134] [0.164] [0.140] [0.145]    
Total Killed 0.023*** 0.019* 0.023*** 0.026*** 
 [0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005]    
N 60285 7068 53217 8898 
Adj. R-sq 0.445 0.376 0.445 0.385 
COARSE 
 
All Districts 
Excluding Dhaka 
Divisional 
HQ Districts 
Excluding 
Divisional HQs Growing Districts 
Hartal Dummy  -0.341*** -0.281 -0.346*** -0.316**  
 [0.115] [0.164] [0.115] [0.115]    
Total Killed -0.005 -0.018* -0.003 -0.007 
 [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.007]    
N 42624 5664 36960 7003 
Adj. R-sq 0.662 0.374 0.688 0.532 
Quad Trend YES YES YES YES 
Day of Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week of Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district and daily level. 
E. Hartal, Wholesale Price, and Vertical Price Gap 
Besides knowing the response of retailers, it is pertinent to learn how the wholesalers, another key 
agent in the rice value chain, respond to political conflicts and violence. Combining wholesalers’ 
and retailers’ responses to hartal would inform better regarding the price transmission in the 
downstream of the value chain. Table 6 presents the estimates on the impact of hartal on weekly 
wholesale price, retail price, and the gap between the two. 
The weekly wholesale prices respond to hartals in a consistent manner across quality types of rice. 
For one additional day of hartal in a week, weekly wholesale price of fine and medium quality 
rice goes up by 0.18 Tk./Kg and 0.15 Tk./Kg respectively while that of coarse rice rise by 0.26 
Tk./Kg. The price hike is larger in markets from divisional districts compared to those in non-
divisional districts (0.10 Tk./Kg higher for fine and coarse, 0.29 Tk./Kg higher for medium rice). 
Note that these weekly estimates are not directly comparable with the impacts reported for retail 
price in Table 3. Because the later utilized the daily level price variation and compare the average 
prices between hartal and non-hartal days to identify the impact on rice prices on hartal days 
whereas the former identifies the impact of one additional hartal day. To make the analysis 
consistent, consequently, a measure on weekly average retail prices are constructed for each 
market by taking the mean of the daily retail prices within a week. As Table 6 shows, for one 
additional day of hartal within a week, average weekly retail prices of all varieties of rice increase 
consistently, with the largest increase observed for low quality (0.16, 0.22, and 0.32 Tk./Kg for 
fine, medium, and coarse quality respectively). The steady pattern of high wholesale prices in 
divisional districts compared to non-divisional districts is not observed in the case of weekly retail 
prices. 
The vertical price gap, the difference between retail and wholesale prices, reflects to what extent 
the rise in weekly wholesale rice prices due to the political shock is transmitted to weekly average 
retail rice prices. The statistical insignificance of vertical price gap for fine quality rice implies that 
retailers in the fine rice market completely pass-through the hartal-effect to retail prices. In 
contrast, for medium and coarse quality rice varieties, the vertical price gap is positive and 
statistically significant, which suggests that weekly retail prices of relatively low quality rice 
increase more compared to their wholesale prices. Further, the retailers of medium and coarse 
quality rice are able to transmit to consumers more than that they absorb through a higher 
wholesale price. However, this more than proportional price transmission is evident only in non-
divisional districts, which indicates to possibly different market structure in divisional districts.   
Table 6: Retail-Wholesale Price Gap (Vertical Gap), by Regions and Quality of Rice 
 Weekly wholesale Weekly Retail Vertical Gap: Retail-wholesale 
 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
 (a) FINE 
Number of 
Hartals in a Week 0.177*** 0.266** 0.167**  0.160** 0.249** 0.146*   0.019 -0.013 0.022 
  [0.061] [0.093] [0.065]    [0.076] [0.076] [0.078]    [0.055] [0.096] [0.060] 
Total  Killed 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004** 0.004* 0.004**  0.001 -0.001** 0.001 
  [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]    [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]    [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
N 7225 621 6604 15434 2116 13318 7111 607 6504 
Adj. R-sq. 0.666 0.802 0.654 0.646 0.74 0.633 0.516 0.877 0.479 
(b) MEDIUM 
 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
Number of 
Hartals in a Week 0.151** 0.407** 0.121*   0.221*** 0.204** 0.224*** 0.062* -0.188 0.089**  
  [0.070] [0.144] [0.072]    [0.080] [0.071] [0.082]    [0.036] [0.188] [0.035]    
injured 0.003* -0.002 0.004**  0.003 0.004* 0.003 -0.001 0.006*** -0.002*   
Total Killed [0.002] [0.007] [0.002]    [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]    [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]    
N 7570 618 6952 16,185 2,139 14046 7513 618 6895 
Adj. R-sq. 0.619 0.554 0.628 0.648 0.613 0.651 0.521 0.416 0.536 
 (c) COARSE 
 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
All 
districts 
Divisional 
Districts 
Non 
Divisional 
Districts 
Number of 
Hartals in a Week  0.255*** 0.349** 0.248*** 0.316*** 0.273** 0.321*** 0.113*** -0.036 0.123**  
  [0.080] [0.126] [0.083]    [0.088] [0.086] [0.088]    [0.035] [0.038] [0.052]    
Total Killed 0.003* 0.006*** 0.003 0.005** 0.006** 0.004**  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]    [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]    [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]    
N 6978 618 6360 6393 1950 5822 6393 571 5822 
Adj. R-sq. 0.677 0.713 0.681 0.722 0.613 0.736 0.47 0.543 0.478 
Quadratic Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District Fixed 
Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of Week 
Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week of Year 
Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Significance level can be read as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district and daily level. 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to systematically measure the impact of political protests on ordinary 
citizen. One way to measure the impact of political strike on the welfare of the people is through 
the general price level of staples, mainly rice.  Rice is a daily consumable item in Bangladesh, an 
essential commodity of the food basket and the main source of carbohydrate and energy. Political 
strikes can affect the food price by disrupting both supply and demand linkage. On the supply side, 
each stage of the supply chain can be affected including production which will have the bearing as 
a price hike on the end consumer. Under supply of inputs (absenteeism of the workers, absence of 
transportation and other logistics, difficulties in accessing finance), at each stage of supply chain 
will push the price level towards ascending direction. Therefore, it is imperative to understand how 
the players of the supply chain (growers, small and large traders, commission agent, urban 
wholesalers, urban retailers) behave in the face of general strikes.  
Department of Agricultural Marketing (DAM), under Ministry of Agriculture of Bangladesh has 
been collecting price information of various commodities at the regional level for decades. The 
retail and wholesale prices of 15 commodities are available from DAM, which collects daily retail 
price data and weekly wholesale price data from one sub-district of all districts and informs other 
government agencies. This high frequency nature of the data allows us to pair them up with the 
political strike data and examine the impact of political strike on three types of rice – fine, medium 
and coarse for the period 2010-2016. 
We find that on the day of hartal the price of rice increases by about 0.02 percent per kilogram, 
this is lower for finer and medium quality and higher for the coarse variety rice. This result is 
robust to severity of hartal and also inclusion of a host of dummies which capture both seasonality 
and unobserved heterogeneity. The impact on price is found to amplify when the strikes are 
stretched over a few days. We find that if a strike is a part of multiple day strikes, the retail prices 
of fine, medium and coarse increase by 1.3, 1.4 and 1.7 taka respectively on that day. We found 
that the rise in rice price adjusts back to pre-hartal level within 5 days after the strike. We did not 
find any change in price one day before strike, neither on the day of hartal announcement.  
In terms of horizontal price gap, we find some evidence in case of medium and coarse rice, except 
in the capital city, which is the premium market of rice purchase. The magnitude of increase in 
coarse rice is very robust to regional differences.  
In case of vertical price gap, we also observe similar patterns – size of increase in price is higher 
for coarse rice. This vertical price gap is also more pronounced for the coarse rice but statistically 
insignificant for medium and fine rice. 
These analysis and findings confirm the fact that political unrest and strikes are costly not 
only for the business and trade, it also has negative bearing on citizens. Interestingly this is more 
for the economically disadvantageous population of the society. Poor population consumes more 
rice, more of the type of coarse variety and buys frequently due to the lack of storage. A rise in 
rice price due to strikes creates a dent in poor’ consumption basket, at the cost of opposition 
political parties desire to press their demands. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure A1:  Procurement Sources of Wholesalers in Dhaka during Hartal and  
Non-hartal Period (2010-2016) 
 
Figure A2: Stated reasons for calling strike 
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Figure A3:  Adjustment Process, by Quality Types 
 
Note: Impact of hartal on the day of hartal shows statistical significance across varieties. However, cumulative impacts of hartal 
turn out to be statistically significant for coarse rice only up to day 1.  No other cumulative impact coefficients exhibit statistical 
significance  
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